We test the effect of the introduction of Medicare Part D on physician prescribing behavior by using data on physician visits from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) 2002-2004 and 2006-2009 for patients aged 60-69. We use regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of part D around the age of 65 before and after 2006 and then compare the discrete jump in outcomes at age 65 before and after Part D. We find a 32% increase in the number of prescription drugs prescribed or continued per visit and a 46% increase in the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued for the elderly after the introduction of Medicare Part D.
Introduction
In the past 50 years, resources devoted to health care have outpaced resources devoted to many other sectors of the U.S. economy. 1 The expansion of the third-party payment system, which results in higher medical care utilization and may stimulate the development and adoption of advanced treatment choices, has often been cited as an important driving force behind rising health expenditures (Weisbrod 1991) . Because of asymmetric information between physicians and patients, physicians serve not only as providers of health care services to patients, but also as advisors to patients, thus taking on a crucial role in the interplay between health insurance, health care utilization, and treatment choices (Arrow 1963) . Indeed, physician agency is considered to be a possible explanation for rising health expenditures associated with insurance coverage (Feldstein 1970) . 2 Thus, understanding the impact of health insurance on physicians' treatment decisions has become critical for identifying the sources of health expenditure growth and for evaluating a host of health policies that aim to improve the efficiency and efficacy of health care delivery. In this paper, we examine the impact of the adoption of Medicare Part D on physicians' prescribing behavior.
The primary goal of Medicare Part D, adopted in January 2006, is to provide drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. 3 Previous literatures have evaluated various effects of Part D, an important national health program accounting for a substantial fraction of health care spending. 4 Most existing studies focus on the effect of Part D on the use and out-of-pocket cost of prescription drugs (Lichtenberg and Sun 2007; Yin et al. 2008; Briesacher et al. 2011; Ketcham and Simon 2008; Engelhardt and Gruber 2011; Liu et al. 2011; Kaestner and Khan 2012) , the utilization of non-drug health care services (Engelhardt and Gruber 2011; Liu et al. 2011; Kaestner and Khan 2012; Zhang 2009; Kaestner et al. 2014) , drug prices Morton 2010, 2011) , and pharmaceutical companies' R&D spending (Blume-Kohout and Sood 2013). The effect of Part D on physician prescribing behavior has received almost no attention in previous work despite the fact that it is a potential mechanism behind any changes in prescription drug consumption or the use of other health care services. For this reason, the extent to which physicians tailor their prescribing to insurance coverage after Part D is a fundamental, policy-relevant question that merits thorough examination.
There are several possible channels through which Part D coverage may affect physician's prescribing behaviors. First, the relationship between a patient's insurance status and a physician's treatment decision can be analyzed using a standard principal-agent framework 1 National health expenditure as a share of GDP grew from about 5% in 1960 to about 17% in 2012. (Source: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html). 2 "Physician agency" is a collective term referring to issues related to physicians' market power, behaviors and incentives (McGuire 2000) . 3 Part D has since become the primary source of drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries, covering more than half of all beneficiaries (57%) in 2006. It decreased the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries with no source of prescription drug coverage from 27% in 2003 to 10% in 2007 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2003 , 2006 , 2007b , and lowered the fraction of prescription drug costs that many Medicare beneficiaries had to pay out-of-pocket at the point of service. 4 Part D has shifted prescription drug costs from Medicaid or private payers to Medicare, and has contributed to a net increase in federal spending. The Medicare share of total national spending on prescription drugs increased from 2% in 2005 to 22% in 2006, and the net federal cost of the Part D program is estimated to be $982 billion for 9 years between 2007 and 2016 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2007a). (Arrow 1963) in which both principals (patients) and agents (physicians) maximize their expected utility. As agents, physicians typically are assumed to maximize the combination of income and non-financial factors, such as utility stemming from adherence to standards of practice and ethics, as well as concern for patient welfare (Chalkley and Malcomson 1998; Ellis and McGuire 1986) . When insurance coverage becomes available, physicians may recommend more procedures and services if they take patients' out-of-pocket (OOP) costs into consideration (at least partial agency). 5 Second, Part D may promote supply-side responses through increasing activities of other relevant parties, such as pharmaceutical companies and pharmacy benefit managers. For example, pharmaceutical companies may increase their promotional activities (e.g. detailing, free samples) after Part D. 6 Physicians may change their prescribing patterns in response to those marketing efforts (Lurie et al. 1990; Engelberg et al. 2013; Sacks 2013) . Pharmacy benefit managers may use the widespread formulary information technology in physicians' offices to further improve physician agency by informing physicians about benefit design and utilization management tools such as tiered copayments, prior authorization requirements, and step therapy of patients' insurance coverage (Epstein and Ketcham 2014) .
Third, demand-side responses may also change physicians' prescribing behaviors. For example, patients who were previously not eligible for any prescription drug coverage are now more likely to be able to afford drug treatment and start visiting physician offices. 7 Patients may be more likely to discuss or inquire about specific drug treatments that they learn about through increased direct-to-consumer advertising.
To estimate how prescribing patterns change for those age 65 and over after Part D, we compare the outcome discontinuity at age 65 before the adoption of Part D to the outcome discontinuity at age 65 after its adoption. Using restricted National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys (NAMCS) data allows us to identify the exact age (in days) of a patient at the time of a physician office visit. This information allows us to use a very narrow bandwidth around age 65 to assure that all other confounders are smooth around the cutoff, which is the key assumption for the regression discontinuity (RD) design. We further compare the effect of turning 65 before and after 2006 taking the difference of discontinuities, and refer to it as difference-in-discontinuities. 8 It differences out the confounding effect of Medicare eligibility for most individuals at age 65 that would plague RD estimation, assuming that the effect of overall Medicare eligibility on the use of medical care is the same before and after 2006. We perform an extensive list of robustness checks in order to ensure that all assumptions of the difference-in-discontinuities specification are met in our sample.
Background on Medicare Part D
Prior to the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA 2003 for short), Medicare had only two fee-for-service components, Part 5 Past literature has provided mixed evidence. While some literature has shown that physicians consider and incorporate patients' health insurance status into their clinical decision making (Wynia et al. 2003; Meyers et al. 2006 ), other work (Federman 2004) does not find evidence of this. 6 Prior work found that advertising of drugs increased only slightly after the introduction of Part D, mostly among drug classes with less competition (defined by the number of advertised drugs within the drug class prior to Part D implementation) or among dominant drugs (defined by higher market share of advertising before the implementation of Part D) (Lakdawalla et al. 2013) . 7 We find little evidence that this may be the case later in the paper. 8 We are aware of two working papers that use similar empirical strategies: Chay et al. (2010) and Grembi et al. (2011 (Lichtenberg and Sun 2007; Yin et al. 2008; Briesacher et al. 2011; Ketcham and Simon 2008; Engelhardt and Gruber 2011; Liu et al. 2011; Kaestner and Khan 2012) . Medicare subsidizes the cost of plan coverage for all types of beneficiaries through various types of plan subsidies, including direct subsidies, individual reinsurance, risk sharing payments, and low-income subsidies. These subsidies target costs of prescription drugs at various stages of plan coverage, or for specific beneficiaries. 9 As a result, Medicare subsidizes about 75% of the cost of standard drug coverage on average.
Last but not least, plans often set their own formulary, which is a tiered structure with different levels of cost sharing across therapeutically similar drugs. To steer enrollees toward less-expensive generic alternatives, plans often place generics on a tier of formulary with the lowest copayment, since generic drugs are bioequivalent to, but much less expensive than, their brand name counterparts. Through design of plan formularies, Part D plans thus encourage the use of generic drugs, in order to help control costs in the plan and to provide a competitive enough premium to attract potential consumers.
Data
Our main analyses use the National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys (NAMCS) 2002-2004 and 2006-2009, supplemented by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Orange Book database, to estimate the impact of Medicare Part D on physicians' prescribing patterns. The NAMCS is conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics. It collects data on a nationally representative sample of visits to non-federally employed office-based physicians in the U.S., excluding radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists. To select physicians for interview, NAMCS uses a multistage probability sample design; this design is described elsewhere (Bryant and Shimizu 1988) . Each physician in the sample is randomly assigned to a 1-week reporting period, and information on a systematic random sample of about 30 visits is then collected. Physicians and patients may be selected multiple times, but there is no identification number to link either patients or physicians longitudinally. Each physician is asked to record information on up to eight drugs (six drugs in 2002) that were ordered, supplied, administered, or continued during the single visit. Prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs, immunizations, allergy shots, anesthetics, chemotherapy, and dietary supplements are included. FDA Orange Book database contains information on drugs' generic status and date of approval. We use the drug name for merging since there are no other variables available that identify drugs in both the NAMCS data and the FDA data. After excluding both overthe-counter (OTC) and injectable drugs, the merge rate between the NAMCS and FDA data is 95%. Most of the non-merged drugs were approved prior to 1982 since the FDA orange book only contains approval dates for drugs approved since 1982. The NAMCS data contain no information on dosage. We first use visit-level data to examine whether physician change prescribing patterns as measured by the number of drugs prescribed or continued for elderly patients after 2006. NAMCS has 27,973 visit records for patients aged 60-69 years old for the sample period 2002-2004 and 2006-2009 . We limit the sample to 26,474 visits (9737 for 2002-2004 and 16,737 for 2006-2009) , excluding 1509 (5.39%) visits for patients who have missing information on any variable used in the analyses. We also examine the change of prescribing patterns as measured by the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued. Although physicians may sometimes write down the brand name of a drug expecting that a generic equivalent may be substituted at the pharmacy, we test whether physicians were more likely to write down the generic rather than the brand name of drugs beginning in 2006 for those aged 65 and over compared to our control group of individuals under age 65. We also control for an extensive set of physician characteristics and patient characteristics in our specification. Sample statistics for our control variables are listed in Appendix Table 8 .
We also use the 2002-2004 and 2006-2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally-representative survey of respondents drawn from the National Health Interview Survey, to examine the impact of Part D on patients' utilization of and expenditure on prescription drugs. MEPS is a 2-year panel with information on the number of prescriptions filled, total expenditure for prescription drugs, and expenditure for drugs from different sources, such as self-pay (OOP costs), Medicare, Medicaid, or private sources. For independent variables, we control for patients' gender, race/ethnicity, poverty category, census region, MSA status, education level, marital status, and prior health conditions. Sample statistics are reported in Appendix Table 9 . After excluding observations with any missing information on the variables we use, we are left with 276,774 observations for the group of respondents aged 60-69.
Empirical strategy
To identify the local average treatment effect of Medicare Part D, implemented on January 1, 2006, we employ an empirical approach that estimates the difference of discontinuities around the age of 65 before and after the policy was implemented. This empirical strategy is built upon the regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares the change in outcomes for patients who are just before and just after age 65. Since the identification comes from the comparison around the age threshold, estimation can be done using only data from after policy adoption (Card et al. 2009 ). For the RD design, the key assumption is that assignment to either side of the discontinuity threshold is as good as random (Lee and Lemieux 2010) . The typical RD equation is as follows:
where Outcome i j is one of the abovementioned outcomes for patient i seen by physician j, 1(age >= 65) i is an indicator for whether patient i is aged 65 or older and h(Age i ) is a flexible polynomial function of age. The coefficient β 1 will identify the effect of being eligible for Medicare.
However, the problem with using only data after 2006 in our context is that most individuals become eligible for Medicare Part D and for inpatient and outpatient coverage at age 65 because they also become eligible for Medicare Parts A and B. It would be difficult to disentangle the impact of Part D policy from the impact of Medicare eligibility more generally, due to the confounding effect of Medicare eligibility that occurs for most individuals at age 65. Therefore, we pool data before and after the policy change to estimate the discontinuities at age 65 before and after policy introduction, and then take the difference of these discontinuities.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
where
Outcome i j is the one of the abovementioned outcomes for patient i seen by physician j; 1(age >= 65) i is an indicator for whether patient i is aged 65 or older, and the variable 1(year >= 2006) i indicates whether the visit takes place on or after January 1, 2006.
In order to best model physician prescribing patterns by patients' age, we take advantage of the exact dates of birth in the NAMCS data. Accordingly, Age i is the number of days between the patient's age at the time of the visit to a physician office and his/her 65th birthday. We include g(Age i ),which is a flexible polynomial function of Age i fully interacted with dummy variables for age 65, 1(age >= 65), and year 2006, 1(year >= 2006). By including g(Age i ), we allow prescribing patterns to take different forms on either side of the age 65 cutoff, before and after year 2006. Our basic specification uses a cubic form for age in the analysis of NAMCS data. 10 Days i is the number of days between the visit date and December 31, 2001, the beginning of our sample period. By using exact dates of visits in the NAMCS data and including g(Days i ), a flexible polynomial function of Days i and their interaction terms with the year 2006 dummy, we can also more precisely model trends in physician prescribing patterns over time, while still allowing for the discrete change at the time of adoption of the policy.
The specification includes control variables for patient characteristics, X i (gender, race, year the visit took place, seasonal fixed effects, Charlson index, 11 and dummies for the major diagnostic category associated with the visit 12 ), physician practice characteristics, Y j (specialty of the physician, 13 whether the physician is in a solo practice or uses electronic medical records, whether the practice is within a metropolitan statistical area, and percentage of revenue from Medicare patients), and state fixed effects State j , which control for any time-invariant characteristics of physician practice patterns in different states. We estimate the equation using ordinary least squares (OLS). 14 All analyses use sample weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the NAMCS survey using Stata software version 12 (Stata-Corp, College Station, Texas).
The identification strategy we present here requires less stringent assumptions than the difference-in-differences (DD) specification. In the context of this paper, we would use DD to estimate the effect of Part D by exploiting relative changes in prescription drug utilization by patients aged 65 and older (i.e., those aged 65-69, the treatment group) who visited physicians' offices before and after January 1, 2006, compared to those of patients under age 65 (i.e., those aged 60-64, the control group) who visited physicians' offices before and after January 1, 2006. One weakness of the DD approach is that it assumes that trends in prescribing patterns are the same for both the treatment and control groups prior to policy implementation, so that the DD estimator identifies only the effect of Part D. However, trends in prescribing patterns are likely to differ by patient age, which makes them differ for treatment and control groups. 15 In some past literature, the DD approach took this difference into account by limiting the sample to a narrow age range, but this does not fully address the issue or verify the validity of the parallel trends assumptions of the DD model. Factors such as patent expiration of certain drugs or entry of new drugs may disproportionately affect a specific age group. And including or excluding that certain age group could affect the significance or even magnitude of the estimated effect. The validity of this parallel trends 11 The Charlson index is a numerical score indicating the severity of patient comorbidities. Each condition is associated with a particular score and the scores for each of three possible diagnoses associated with a NAMCS visit are totaled to calculate the index. The Charlson comorbidity index has been shown to predict subsequent mortality (Charlson et al. 1987) . 12 Major disease category includes infectious and parasitic diseases, neoplasms, endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, and immunity disorders, mental disorders, congenital anomalies, as well as diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs, nervous system and sense organs, circulatory system, respiratory system, digestive system, genitourinary system, skin and subcutaneous tissue, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue. Also symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions. 13 Internal Medicine, Pediatrics, General Surgery, Obstetrics & Gynecology, Orthopedic Surgery, Cardiovascular Diseases, Dermatology, Urology, Psychiatry, Neurology, Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, or other specialties relative to General/Family Practice. 14 We also estimate the model using Generalized Least Square (GLM) regressions. The results are similar to results we present from OLS regressions. 15 We calculate the number of prescription and generic drugs prescribed or continued by physicians by patient age group and perform a Wald test to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the means of outcomes between pair-wise ages and p-values from results to reject the null hypothesis that means are equal. assumption is even more questionable due to the possibility of anticipatory effects, as we will discuss in "Anticipatory effect" section.
We do not need to impose the parallel trends assumption because we model physician prescribing patterns flexibly at both sides of the age 65 cut off as well as before and after 2006. The only two assumptions required by this specification are:
1. The confounding discontinuities must be time-invariant. This is equivalent to the RD condition about continuity of potential outcomes; and 2. The treatment effect and the confounding effect are additive. This is equivalent to the additivity conditions in the DD specification (Grembi et al. 2011) .
Under the identifying assumption that other determinants of prescribing patterns are continuous at the age 65 cutoff (defined by whether patients are at least at their 65th birthday when they visit the physician), both before and after year 2006, the coefficient on the interaction of the age 65 dummy and the year 2006 dummy [β 3 in Eq. (1)] will be an unbiased difference-in-discontinuities estimate of the effect of Part D on outcomes. Specifically, it produces intention-to-treat effects of Part D on physicians' prescribing behaviors for the elderly who are just above age 65. We do not uncover the treatment effect on the treated for two important reasons. First, it is not clear who the treated are. Our treated could be those who move from private health insurance to Part D, or those who move from no drug coverage to Part D. Furthermore, people may also participate in different Part D plans that produce heterogeneous treatment effects. We can potentially estimate the treatment effect on the treated by estimating the difference-in-discontinuities for subgroups. However, our data lack information on prior drug insurance or specific Part D plans. Second, in the context of physician's prescribing behavior, the intention-to-treat effect may have the most meaningful policy implications, because it also captures spillover effects. After the introduction of Part D, physicians may change prescribing patterns to all who are older than 65, regardless of whether they acquired drug coverage due to Part D or not.
We test the validity of assumptions for the difference-in-discontinuities specification and the robustness of results in a number of ways. First, we check the density of the running variable Age i around the age 65 cutoff, both before and after year 2006, in order to test whether the eligibility criteria is manipulated around the threshold (McCrary 2008) . Second, we estimate Eq. (1) with covariates as outcomes in order to validate the basic assumption of the difference-in-discontinuities specification. If the differences of discontinuities of all observables are not statistically significant, the assumption that the confounding discontinuities are time invariant is more likely to be valid. Third, we estimate specifications using different age bandwidths and different orders of polynomial functions of age, both with and without covariates. It is a necessary step when using regression discontinuity design in the analysis to investigate the sensitivity of the choice of bandwidth (Imbens 2008) . If the estimates and standard errors are critically dependent on the choice of bandwidth, they are less credible. Fourth, we implement a placebo DD-RD estimation at an arbitrary cutoff defined as age 64 and above.
The impact of Part D on physicians' prescribing patterns Graphical evidence
We first present graphical evidence of the impact of Part D on physician prescribing behavior, using NAMCS data. Figure 1 plots the mean for the number of prescription drugs prescribed or Table 1 and discussed below. Figure 2 shows the mean for the number of generic drugs that physicians prescribe or continue, created using the method described above. There is no discernible jump in the outcome from below age 65 to above age 65 before policy adoption. The average number of generic drugs prescribed or continued during patient visits does increase from 0.9 prescriptions to more than 1.2 prescriptions, or roughly a 0.3 prescription increase, after policy adoption. Similarly, a statistical test of the difference in the jumps in Fig. 2 is contained in column (8), top panel of Table 1 and discussed below.
Regression results
In the top panel of Table 1 , we summarize the regression estimates of the change in the number of all prescription drugs and generic drugs prescribed or continued. 16 We 
(8) For the regression using the sample after 2006, the coefficient of interest is positive and significant, implying that there is a 0.3 prescription increase for patients aged 65 and above. This increase is similar in magnitude to that of the discontinuity from Fig. 1 . For the 2002-2004 sample, the RD coefficient is negative with a magnitude of 0.29 prescriptions. This implies that before the adoption of the Part D policy, the number of drugs prescribed or continued at physician visits decreased discontinuously at age 65. Although not precisely estimated, the negative coefficient may reflect the fact that some patients aged 65 and above were likely to lose their prescription drug coverage from employer-sponsored insurance or other public/private coverage at age 65. The third column is the difference-in-discontinuities specification without any covariates, allowing for a cubic functions of age on either side of the 65 and year 2006 cutoffs. The coefficient on the interaction term between the age 65 dummy and the year 2006 dummy is positive and significant. This indicates that there is a 0.61 increase in the number of prescription drugs for patients aged 65 and above relative to patients under age 65 after adoption of the Part D policy. In the fourth column, the estimated difference-in-discontinuities coefficient is slightly lower after controlling for covariates than the estimate without controls, but is still significant with a 0.56 prescription increase. This supports the assumption that there are no other changes occurring at age 65 in 2006 that are confounding our analysis. It also confirms our observation from Fig. 1 , that physicians increase their prescriptions (either new or continued) to patients aged 65 and above by 32% on average (calculated as 0.563 divided by 1.742, the mean for the number of drugs prescribed or continued for nonpatients aged 65 and above before 2006 from Appendix Table 7) after the adoption of Part D, compared to drugs prescribed or continued for patients under age 65. The coefficient on the interaction term is still significant if we change the order of the polynomial function of age to a quartic function in column (5). Consistent results across different specifications imply that the estimated effect is robust to various functional forms for age, i.e., that the significance of estimates of the impact of Part D is not an artifact of how we specify the age control function.
Columns (6)- (10) summarize results for the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued. In the top panel, the estimated result for the regression with a cubic function of age (column 8) is positive and significant, indicating an increase of 0.26 prescriptions on average. This is similar to the magnitude of the increase shown in Fig. 2 . We find similar results with RD using the 2006-2009 sample (column 7), using the DD-RD specification with controls (column 9) and with higher order polynomial functions of age (column 10). This indicates that after the adoption of Part D, physicians are likely to increase the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued during visits among patients aged 65 and above relative to patients under age 65 by 46% (calculated as 0.256 divided by 0.555 the mean of number of generic drugs prescribed or continued during visits for patients aged 65 and above before 2006).
Anticipatory effect
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents regression results for a sample that includes patients visiting physician offices in 2005. We find that the magnitudes of effects using the differencein-discontinuities specification, with or without covariates, are all greater than those in the top panel. After stratifying the sample according to the year 2006 cutoff and running separate regressions on the sample before and after 2006, we find that the estimated effect for the sample before 2006 is negative and significant for the number of drugs prescribed or continued (column 1). Comparing results in the second column of the bottom panel to those in the top panel, it is apparent that the difference comes from the decrease in the number of drugs prescribed or continued for patients aged 65 and above in 2005. It appears that those patients and their physicians anticipated the upcoming Part D policy and postponed or reduced the number of drugs prescribed or continued until the time that Part D coverage took effect. After we include the 2005 sample in the regression, we estimate that Part D results in physicians increasing the number of prescription drugs prescribed or continued for patients aged 65 and above by 45%, a more than 40% greater effect than comes from our previous differencein-discontinuities estimation. This effect is similar in size to the anticipatory effect found in Alpert (2012) . There is also evidence that this anticipatory effect exists for the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued.
Validity of specifications and robustness checks
This subsection describes the sensitivity analyses we performed in order to test the assumptions of the difference-in-discontinuities specification, and check the robustness of the main results. First, we graphically examined the continuity of the age profile at the age 65 cutoff for the 2002-2004 and the 2006-2009 samples. If patients were less likely to go to their physicians' office just before they became eligible for Part D coverage and were more likely to go after they became eligible then our estimates would suffer from selection bias. Second, we examined the evidence for sample selection bias in our specification. If the sample before and after the age 65 cut-off was different before and after 2006, then our estimates of the difference-in-discontinuities specification may reflect the change in the composition of the sample, not the effect of the policy adoption itself. We estimate a difference-in-discontinuities model with the covariates as outcome variables. Our results are summarized in Table 2 . All but one variable show no differential jump at the age 65 cutoffs between the two time periods. The coefficient for the race indicator-that is, the non-white dummy-is only significant at 10%, and excluding this variable does not affect our basic results in the main analyses. 17 These results further validate our assumptions for the difference-in-discontinuities specification and reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias.
Next, we test the robustness of our main results by estimating the difference-indiscontinuities model using different bandwidths, with and without covariates. The results are summarized in Table 3 . We control for different polynomial functions of age in the samples with different bandwidths. In the first column, we control for age linearly with a bandwidth of 1 year on each side of the age 65 cutoff. In the second and third columns, we use quadratic and cubic age functions, with a bandwidth of 2 years on each side. The fourth column shows the results with a cubic age function and a bandwidth of 3 years. The fifth and sixth columns show the results with quartic age functions and bandwidths of 5 and 6 years on each side of the age 65 cutoff, respectively. All of the regression coefficients for the number of drugs prescribed or continued and the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued, with or without covariates, are significantly positive, with magnitudes similar to those shown in Table Table 2 Robustness checks, difference-in-discontinuities estimates for covariates, NAMCS 2002 NAMCS -2004 NAMCS and 2006 NAMCS -2009 In results not included here, we also test whether there is any confounding in other physician and patient characteristics, including physician specialty, patient major disease categories, and seasonal dummies.
*** Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test); ** Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test); * Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test) Age 58-71 Results from linear regression with standard errors in parentheses. We include in all regressions a dummy for year 2006 or later, age 65 or over, a polynomial control for age in days and full interaction with the age 65 dummy and year 2006 dummy. Additionally, in panel B for both outcomes, we adjust for patient sex, race, Charlson index dummies, disease category by primary diagnosis codes, visit quarter, physician specialty type, whether it is a solo practice or not, electronic medical records utilization, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status and dummy for revenue from Medicare patients above median. *** Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test); ** Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test); * Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test)
1. We conclude that adoption of Part D leads to an increase in the number of drugs, especially generic drugs, prescribed or continued during physician visits for patients beginning at age 65. Finally, we conduct an extensive set of placebo tests for the main analysis sample (age 60-69), and for samples with varying bandwidths, to ensure that our results represent a causal relationship rather than spurious correlation between Part D and outcomes. We set age 64 as the cutoff and estimate the difference-in-discontinuities specification, with and without covariates, on all samples. Our results are summarized in Table 4 . The results are statistically significant for only three out of 32 specifications, and only at the 10% levels. Thus the placebo test suggests that our results are not due to spurious correlation.
Extensions
Our basic results suggest that physicians do take patients' costs into consideration and do respond to non-pecuniary incentives by increasing the number of drugs prescribed or continued during physician visits. In this section, we describe a series of supplementary analyses we conduct in order to evaluate other changes in physician practice patterns in physician offices and possible mechanisms for the documented increase in the number of drugs prescribed or continued.
Other practice pattern changes
What effect does Part D have on practice patterns in office settings, other than prescription drug prescribing? We use the difference-in-discontinuities specification again with cubic and quartic functions of age. Results are summarized in Table 5 ; those with a cubic polynomial of age are in the top panel, and those with a quartic polynomial of age are in the bottom panel.
We examine the effect of Part D on the number of tests 18 conducted in the physicians' office (column 1) and patients' time spent with their doctor (column 2). These outcomes may be measures of treatment intensity during a doctor's visit. We find no significant effects of Part D on these two outcomes with either cubic or quartic polynomials in age as controls.
Prescription of newer drugs
We link NAMCS and US FDA Orange Book data to analyze the effect of Part D on the age of active ingredients of drugs prescribed or continued during physician visits. We find no significant results for this outcome, with either cubic or quartic polynomials in age as controls (column 3, Table 5 ). This suggests that physicians did not prescribe (or continue) newer (or older) drugs after the implementation of Part D. Nor do we find a significant impact of Part D on the number of brand-name drugs prescribed or continued during physician visits (column 4, Table 5 ).
Patients' behaviors
We use the 2002-2004 and 2006-2009 MEPS to examine the impact of Part D on patients' utilization of and expenditure on prescription drugs, again using the difference-in-discontinuities Table 4 Robustness checks, difference-in-discontinuities estimates for number of drugs prescribed or continued during physician visits with placebo cut-off, Results from linear regression with standard errors in parentheses. Control variables for regressions include a dummy for year 2006 or later, age 65 or over, a polynomial control for age in days and full interaction with the age 65 dummy and year 2006 dummy, patient sex, race, Charlson index dummies, disease category by primary diagnosis codes, visit quarter, physician specialty type, whether it is a solo practice or not, electronic medical records utilization, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status and dummy for revenue from Medicare patients above median. *** Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test); ** Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test); * Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test) Results from linear regression with standard errors in parentheses. Control variables for regressions include a dummy for year 2006 or later, age 65 or over, a polynomial control for age in days and full interaction with the age 65 dummy and year 2006 dummy, patient sex, race, Charlson index dummies, disease category by primary diagnosis codes, visit quarter, physician specialty type, whether it is a solo practice or not, electronic medical records utilization, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) status and dummy for revenue from Medicare patients above median. The R-squared statistics is not available for regressions with the dependent variable consisting of the age of active ingredients because these are censored regressions; the date of approval for drugs in the Orange Book database is only available after 1982. *** Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test); ** Significant at the 5% level (two-tail test); * Significant at the 10% level (two-tail test) design. Although we don't have specific date of birth and date of interview in the MEPS data, we are still able to control for a polynomial function of age in years at the time of interview. Results are reported in Table 6 . These results are consistent for all outcomes, controlling for either a linear or quadratic function of age. The number of prescription drugs increases by a statistically significant 8.3-11.8 prescriptions per year on average. This means that patients increase their use of prescription drugs by 39-55% when they turn age 65 after the adoption of Part D as compared to before its adoption. Total expenditures on prescription drugs per individual per year and expenditures on prescription drugs from Medicare sources also increase at the age 65 cutoff after 2006, although the coefficients for the former outcome are not precisely estimated. OOP cost and the sign and magnitude of estimated effects are consistent with those in previous literature. 19 However, our effects on these outcomes are not 19 Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) found that in 2006, Medicare Part D reduced OOP daily cost of therapy by 18.4% and increased number of days of therapy by about 12.8% compared to that for users under the age of 65. Yin et al. (2008) find a 5.9% increase in monthly average drug utilization and a 13.1% decrease in monthly OOP cost after the penalty free period (i.e., after June 2006) using those aged 60-63 as the reference group. Ketcham and Simon (2008) estimate that days' supply and number of individual prescriptions filled increase by 8.1 and 4.8% respectively, and OOP costs fall by 17.2% for the always eligible group (over 66 as of 2007) as compared to those who are always ineligible for Medicare (58-64 as of 2007). Engelhardt and Gruber (2011) find that Part D has a relatively small impact on OOP spending, and F. X. Liu et al. (2011) find that Part D is associated with a $179.86 reduction in OOP cost and an increase of 2.05 prescriptions per patient year. Kaestner and Khan (2012) found that getting drug coverage is associated with an approximately 70% increase in the use of prescription drugs for the general population of those aged 65-85 years old, and a 60% increase in the use of prescription drugs for those with chronic conditions. Briesacher et al. (2011) simulated post-Part D outcomes using time-series regressions with a first-order autoregressive correlation structure and 
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we examine the impact of insurance expansion on a specific physician behavior, prescribing drugs to patients. We use a difference-in-discontinuities specification to identify the effect of Part D on physician prescribing behavior. We compare the discontinuity of physicians' prescribing patterns for those who were just below and just above the age of 65 before the adoption of Part D to the discontinuity after its adoption. Our results suggest an increase in the number of drugs prescribed or continued as well as an increase in the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued for each patient's visit to a physician's office following the implementation of Medicare Part D. We also perform extensive robustness checks to assure that all assumptions of the difference-in-discontinuities specification are met in our sample.
Our procedure provides intent-to-treat effects, since we estimate the Part D effects on the elderly who are just above 65 after 2006 rather than only those who choose Part D coverage. This estimate potentially captures the full impact of Part D on the elderly regardless of their prior drug insurance status or their choice of any specific Part D drug plan as well as spillover effects from physicians' prescribing behaviors. Our results suggest that physicians increased the number of drugs prescribed or continued by 32% and the number of generic drugs prescribed or continued by 46% (relative to their mean values prior to 2006) for those who are just above 65 after Part D. We observed a much greater impact on the number of generic drugs probably because of the design of many drug plans. Private insurers that administer Part D plans adopt various benefit designs, including the formularies, prior authorization requirements, and other tools to steer enrollees to less-expensive generic alternatives.
We also study whether physicians anticipated the upcoming drug coverage provided by Part D and thus deferred drug prescription until the time of its adoption. Specifically, we compare the estimated effect of Part D on prescription decisions for the sample period with and without the year 2005. Results with, compared to without, 2005 data suggest that ignoring the deferment of some prescriptions in 2005 would result in a 40% over-estimation of the Part D effect. This is consistent with the magnitude of the estimated anticipatory effect in Alpert (2012) , and provides additional evidence that physicians consider patients' cost when prescribing drugs.
We assess the impact of Medicare Part D on other practice patterns in physicians' office, but did not find significant results. This indicates that physicians do not change treatment intensity for their patients aged 65 and above in these other ways when their patients are more likely to have drug coverage. These results imply that laboratory tests or patients' time spent with their doctor are neither complements nor substitutes for drug treatments. We also 20 The insignificance of our results for some outcomes in the MEPS could result partly from insufficient information in the public use version of the MEPS data to precisely estimate age profiles and time trends of outcomes. study whether physicians are more likely to prescribe newer drugs or brand-name drugs for elderly patients following the implementation of Medicare Part D, but also find insignificant results. When performing analysis on whether physicians are more likely to prescribe newer drugs, we used the earliest date of FDA approval for the active ingredient contained in the drug to calculate drug age, regardless of drugs' manufacturers, strengths, or packaging. The insignificant results in the paper did not rule out the possibilities that physicians prescribe drugs with newer formulations or better dosages or administrative routes which can all be beneficial to patients' health.
Using MEPS data, we find that utilization of prescription drugs per person per year rose by 39% after Part D, which is close to what we observe in the NAMCS data, suggesting that physician responses to the Part D policy are a major factor underlying increased drug consumption compared to increased compliance with physician prescribing. 21 However, we also call for caution when comparing results from the MEPS and NAMCS data. The NAMCS data and MEPS data utilize different sampling frames. Patients in the NAMCS data are those who actually visited a physicians' office, while the survey respondents in the MEPS data have not necessarily visited physicians' offices. The demographic characteristics, health status, and other characteristics might be different between the two data sets in ways that could potentially affect physicians' prescribing patterns.
There are caveats to our findings. First, we estimate the increase in the propensity of physicians to write down the generic rather than the brand name of drugs. The actual number of prescription fills for generic drugs is likely to be higher than our estimates for both those aged 65-69 and those aged 60-64 since substitution from brand name to generic equivalents often occurs at the pharmacy. Although this substitution may be expected by the physician, a change in the propensity of physicians to write down the generic rather than the brand name of a drug for those aged 65-69 compared to those aged 60-64 in 2006 should reflect effects of the introduction of Part D unless there was a change in incentives for those under age 65 that happened at the same time as Part D was introduced though unrelated to Part D. Second, the introduction of Part D could lead to spillover effects causing physicians to change their prescribing patterns for patients with insurance sources other than Medicare. We do not distinguish in this paper between main versus spillover effects of the introduction of Part D. Finally, although we find an increase in the number of drugs prescribed or continued during physician visits for those aged 65-69 after 2006 relative to a control group of patients aged 60-64, we do not distinguish whether the increase is in new prescriptions written or in increased continuation or renewal of prescriptions. These points may suggest possible directions for future research.
Appendix: Description of the data-merging procedure
The FDA drug approval database was retrieved from: http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Information OnDrugs/ucm129689.htm (August, 2011) .
Three zipped ASCII files were downloaded from the website. The one under the name products.txt was the one containing information about ingredient, dosage form, trade name, approval date and type (whether a prescription drug or not). We transferred the data into Stata . These variables are coded using a different coding system beginning in 2006, but with the SAS program (DRUGCHAR_MULTUM_'year'.sas) provided available from NCHS, one can update the coding for variables from NAMCS 2002-2005 so that they are coded as are the variables for 2006 and forward. We then identify the drug trade name using appendix B (drug entry codes and names in numeric order) from the FDA site. We imported data into Stata and merged this list with NAMCS data.
This resulted in the drug trade names appearing in both the FDA and NAMCS datasets, so we could then merge the FDA approval date with the NAMCS data using the first word of the drug name. (Most of the drugs can be identified with the first word in its name). The merge rate for drugs prescribed in the NAMCS drug sample was 95% with this method. 22 See Tables 7, 8 and 9. 
